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Five	macroeconomic	lessons	COVID	has	taught	us
The	pandemic	has	turned	some	economic	assumptions	upside	down,	says	Andrés	Velasco	(LSE).
Economists	have	never	experienced	a	crisis	like	this	one.	Never	before	have	governments	told	workers	not	to	work
and	firms	not	to	produce.	The	global	financial	crisis	and	the	various	debt,	unemployment	and	banking	crises	of
recent	decades	pale	by	comparison.	So	what	have	we	learnt?
Economic	crises	can	always	be	bigger
When	the	financial	crisis	hit	12	years	ago,	I	was	finance	minister	in	Chile.	I	gave	many	speeches	saying	that	we
would	never	have	a	crisis	bigger	than	that	one–even	bigger	than	the	Great	Depression.	But	world	GDP	was	still
growing	—albeit	barely—in	2009,	and	it	fell	by	over	three	percentage	points	in	2020.	The	sudden	and	sharp	drops
in	employment	and	output	last	year	were	almost	certainly	larger	than	anything	humanity	has	experienced	in	the	past
century.	The	economic	crisis	prompted	by	the	pandemic	is	huge,	although	for	a	few	countries–the	United	States
and	China	among	them—it	will	be	short	lived.
Supply	shocks	can	become	demand	shocks
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When	the	government	tells	firms	not	to	produce,	and	when	it	orders	workers	not	to	jump	on	the	Tube	and	go	to
work,	that	is	what	economists	call	a	supply	shock.	The	pandemic	constrains	the	ability	of	the	economy	to	supply
goods.	In	addition,	if	you	are	not	someone	who	can	work	from	home,	and	as	a	result	your	income	goes	down,	you
will	buy	less	than	you	otherwise	would.	So	the	supply	shock	generates	demand	shock,	and	the	economy	gets	twice.
On	top	of	that,	an	open	economy	can	be	hit	by	several	other	shocks.	For	instance,		as	world	trade	collapses	the
prices	of	exports	are	likely	to	go	down.	For	a	poor	country	with	a	lot	of	migrants,	remittances	will	go	down.	Capital
inflows	also	dried	in	many	countries.	What	started	as	one	domestic	shock	became	five	or	six	worldwide	shocks.
That	helps	explain	how	sharp	and	how	deep	the	recession	was	in	2020.
Rich	countries	can	simply	carry	on	borrowing
Paraphrasing	Mario	Draghi,	the	former	head	of	the	European	Central	Bank,	rich	governments	have	done	“whatever
it	takes”	during	the	pandemic.	They	have	been	spending	and	borrowing	with	abandon,	writing	cheques,	handing	out
subsidies	and	funding	furlough	schemes	GDP.		That	is	as	true	of	conservative	governments	as	it	is	of	left	wing
governments.	Even	fiscally	austere	Germany	has	been	borrowing	like	there	is	no	tomorrow.
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Had	someone	had	told	me	the	US	and	the	UK	would	be	running	fiscal	deficits	of	15%	of	GDP	and	higher,	my
reaction	would	have	been:	‘What	are	you	smoking?’	Of	course	this	has	happened	at	a	very	unusual	time,	when
world	interest	rates	remain	ultra-low.	If	interest	rates	are	zero	or	negative,	the	carrying	cost	of	public	debt	is	also
zero	or	negative.
The	big	question,	of	course,	is	what	will	happen	if	and	when	interest	rates	return	to	normal.	If	public	debt	is	the
same	size	of	GDP—as	it	is	today	in	the	UK	and	the	US—and	interest	rates	suddenly	go	back	to	4	or	5	percent,	is
that	debt	sustainable?	I	hope	we	will	not	have	to	answer	that	question	in	the	next	year	or	two,	but	you	never	know.
The	world	is	very	unfair
The	other	thing	economists	learned	(and	only	naive	economists	could	learn	this,	for	it	has	long	been	obvious	to
everybody	else)	is	that	it	is	a	very	unfair	world	out	there.	Just	as	rich	countries	were	doing	“whatever	it	takes”	to
stay	afloat,	middle-income	and	poor	countries	were	doing	not	‘whatever	it	takes’	but	“whatever	they	could	afford”.
The	IMF	reports	that	in	response	to	the	pandemic,		on	average	middle	income	countries	spent	half	as	much	as	rich
countries	as	a	share	of	GDP,	and	poor	countries	spent	half	as	much	as	middle	income	countries.	These	huge
differences	in	countries’	ability	to	respond	to	the	pandemic	are	based	on	enormous	differences	in	the	ability	of
governments	to	mobilise	resources,	either	from	domestic	or	international	sources.
International	institutions	have	come	up	short
Confronted	with	a	crisis	of	this	magnitude,	and	a	gigantic	asymmetry	in	the	ability	of	rich,	middle-income	and	poor
countries	to	borrow,	global	financial	institutions	have	come	up	short.	They	have	achieved	much	less	than	the	G20,
led	by	the	UK,	did	in	2010.	A	couple	of	numbers	illustrate	the	point.	At	the	beginning	of	the	crisis	the	International
Monetary	Fund	said	it	was	in	a	position	to	lend	$1	trillion.	In	fact,	the	IMF	has	only	lent	out	about	$200	billion,	and	if
you	narrow	the	definition	it	turns	out	to	be	more	like	$85	billion.	That	may	sound	like	a	great	deal	of	money,	but	in	a
world	financial	crisis	it	is	peanuts.
Politicians	have	been	repeating	that	‘no	one	is	safe	until	everyone	is	safe’,	but	when	it	comes	to	global	financial	aid
few	concrete	actions	have	matched	those	lofty	words.	In	rich	countries	the	crisis	will	be	deep	but	short-lived.	In	the
rest	of	the	world	it	will	be	deep	and	persistent.	We	will	pay	the	price	both	in	lives	and	in	livelihoods.	It	is	a	very	sad
conclusion.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	nor	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	is	based	on	Andrés
Velasco’s	contribution	to	Lessons	Learnt	from	the	Pandemic,	an	LSE	event	hosted	by	the	School	of	Public	Policy.
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